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It has been only ten years since the A&M Records v. Napster1 
decision ushered in the modern era of digital online media for 
consumers.  Since then, some companies have matured into viable 
businesses, notably Apple’s iTunes2 and YouTube.  Others have 
* Resident Scholar, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.  I wish to thank Adriana
Cervantes and Brandy Worden, the Comm/Ent Executive Symposium Editors, as well as 
my co-panelists Lila Bailey, Andrew Bridges, and Kelly Klaus, for their extremely helpful 
comments and insights into this subject.  I also wish to thank my law clerk, Pamela Ng, for 
her valuable contributions to this article. 
1. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
2. Apple launched iTunes as standalone music-management software in January
2001. Press Release, Alicia Awbrey & Nicole Scott, Apple, Inc., Apple Introduces iTunes–
World’s Best and Easiest to Use Jukebox Software (Jan. 9, 2001), www.apple. 
com/pr/library/2001/jan/09itunes.html.  Apple then launched the iTunes Store in April 
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taken the cat-and-mouse game of file sharing from the peer-to-peer 
technology of Napster to bit-torrent technology and, more recently, 
to cloud computing and storage. 
In its December 2010 issue, Wired magazine proclaimed: “The age 
of stealing music via the Internet is officially over.  It’s time for 
everybody to go legit.  The reason: We won.”3  The Wired article 
argues that, in the past ten years, the usability and pricing of “legit” 
digital media providers have improved to the point that it is no longer 
worth the hassle of pirating downloads.  In other words, the article 
claims, consumers now get everything they want from the above-
board services. 
Yet the industry’s battle against digital media piracy continues. 
This article, which is an expansion of remarks from a panel discussion 
at the 2010 UC Hastings Comm/Ent Symposium, examines five 
reported decisions in cases brought by content providers against 
online media providers, alleging secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.  The results in those cases have varied, often seemingly 
in line with the quality of the defendant’s “attitude.”  After 
summarizing those cases, this article concludes by attempting to 
extrapolate several themes to look for in future cases. 
I. Historical Background
A. The Sony Betamax Case
Even the Napster case stood on the shoulders of law created by
predecessor technology.  Our story starts with Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios4—the Betamax5 case.  This case involved the 
question of whether the use of videocassette recorders (“VCR”) to 
record copyrighted television shows was permissible.  Although most 
2003.  John Borland, Apple Unveils Music Store, CNET NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2003, 12:16 PM) 
http://news.cnet.com/Apple-unveils-music-store/2100-1027_3-998590.html. 
3. Paul Boutin, The Age of Music Piracy is Officially Over, WIRED, Nov. 29, 2010,
available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/11/st_essay_nofreebird. 
4. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
5. In the early 1980s, there were two competing formats for videocassettes, Video
Home System (“VHS”) and Betamax.  VHS was supported by JVC and Betamax was 
supported by Sony.  Michael A. Cusumano, et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market 
Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV., 51, 52 (1992).  Although 
many considered Betamax to be technically superior, it lost in the marketplace.  Id.  A 
similar battle was fought twenty-five years later between two competing formats for high-
definition Digital Versatile Discs (“DVD”), between HD-DVD and Blu-Ray.  Again, one 
format emerged the winner—here, it was Blu-Ray.  Martin Fackler, Toshiba Concedes 
Defeat in the DVD Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/02/20/technology/20disc.html. 
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home users of VCRs used them merely for “time-shifting” (i.e., 
recording a show to watch it later), some users built libraries of shows 
they had recorded.6  The district court ruled that noncommercial 
home recording of broadcast television was permissible fair use.7  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that home use was not fair use and 
therefore constituted copyright infringement.8  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the primary purpose of VCRs was to record television 
shows, of which “virtually all”9 were copyrighted material. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that VCRs were not “suitable for 
any substantial noninfringing use.”10  As such, Sony was liable for 
contributory infringement and charged with knowledge of the end-
users’ infringement because it was obvious that people were using 
their VCRs for infringement—the “most conspicuous use.”  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court imported the concept of 
“substantial noninfringing [use]” from patent law.11  The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that home noncommercial time-shifting by 
consumers is fair use12 (i.e., this is a “substantial non-infringing use”).13  
Therefore, Sony could not be held liable for contributory 
infringement.14 
B. The DMCA
In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”).15  The DMCA includes four “safe harbor” provisions 
permitting online content providers to escape infringement liability 
based on infringing content that passes through their systems.16  These 
safe harbors are available to “service providers”17 who have 
implemented and publicized a policy of terminating repeat 
infringers.18  However, these service providers do not have an 
6. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
7. Id. at 425.
8. Id. at 427.
9. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir.
1981). 
10. Id. at 428.
11. Id. at 442.
12. Id. at 455.
13. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512–1301 (2010).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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independent duty to search for infringing content.19  Two of the safe 
harbor provisions, sections 512(c) and (d), are of particular interest 
here.20 
Section 512(c) applies to “hosting” services.  It protects service 
providers from liability if they (i) neither know21 nor have reason to 
know22 that hosted material is infringing; (ii) are unable to control 
what users post (or, if they can control the posting of content, they 
have no direct financial benefit from the postings);23 (iii) devise, 
implement, and publicize a policy for terminating service to repeat 
infringers;24 (iv) do not undercut the effectiveness of standard 
technological protection measures;25 and (v) comply with the 
requirements for notice and takedown procedures.26 
Section 512(d) provides a safe harbor to “information location 
tools,” such as providers that provide links to online locations 
containing infringing information or the means to locate infringing 
material.27  Section 512(d) has the same safe harbor requirements as 
section 512(c).28 
C. The Napster Case
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit handed down the first appellate
decision concerning online peer-to-peer file sharing of MP3s.29  In 
Napster, users undisputedly directly infringed copyrights on the 
recordings they were sharing30 and the court held that the users’ acts 
of copying likely did not constitute fair use.31  Napster, who provided 
a website, servers, indexing, and tech support,32 was preliminarily 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
20. The other two safe harbor provisions, sections 512(a) and (b), protect,
respectively, service providers who merely provide the transmission medium and who 
provide intermediate, temporary system caching. 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
28. Id.
29. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
30. Id. at 1013–14.
31. Id. at 1019.
32. Id. at 1011–12.
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enjoined because it was likely liable for contributory and vicarious 
infringement.33   
Contributory infringement arises when someone knowingly 
encourages and assists infringement.34  That is, they know of specific 
act(s) of infringement, fail to block them, and assist other users by 
providing a site and facilities for the infringement.35  Under Sony, the 
fact that a machine or technology “could be and [was] used to 
infringe” is not enough to support a finding of contributory 
infringement.36   
Vicarious infringement arises when the defendant has a direct 
financial interest, combined with the right and ability to supervise 
(e.g., in the use of search indices), and fails to act to block the 
infringement.37  In Napster, the Ninth Circuit held that DMCA section 
512(d) provided no safe harbor against the preliminary injunction, 
and the court noted that “serious questions regarding Napster’s 
ability to obtain shelter” under the safe harbor.38  In particular, the 
Ninth Circuit questioned (1) whether Napster was an Internet service 
provider, (2) whether “official” notice of infringement was required, 
and (3) whether Napster had a DMCA-compliant copyright 
compliance policy.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the 
preliminary injunction.39 
D. The Grokster Case
Four years later, the Supreme Court weighed in on these issues in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.40  Grokster 
offered a peer-to-peer file sharing service that was theoretically 
capable of both lawful and unlawful use.41  The FastTrack and 
Morpheus (Gnutella) technologies used by Grokster enabled users to 
send requests for files directly to other users.42  The files are then 
transmitted directly from peer-to-peer and Grokster itself provides no 
servers.43  Rather, users installed the software, which enabled them to 
33. Id. at 1020, 1024.
34. Id. at 1019.
35. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021–22.
36. Id. at 1020; See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
37. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
38. Id. at 1025.
39. Id. at 1029.
40. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
41. Id. at 918–19.
42. Id. at 921.
43. Id. at 922.
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access the network.44  An index could be found on a “supernode” 
computer, which would enable downloads from other peers in the 
network.45  Although there were many potential noninfringing uses, a 
study showed that more than 90 percent of the files exchanged via 
Grokster were copyrighted.46  Unlike in Sony, Grokster had clearly 
stated an objective to use the network for the purpose of 
infringement.47  The Supreme Court held that liability for inducing 
infringement arises where there is a clear expression or affirmative 
steps to further infringement, but that mere knowledge of potential 
infringement is not enough to create liability.48  In other words, only 
“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” generates liability.49  
The Supreme Court found Grokster liable because its service was 
aimed at a known source of demand for infringement (i.e., former 
Napster users).  Grokster made no effort to develop filtering tools 
and its financial interests were advanced via the increased ad revenue 
that accompanied the high-volume traffic brought by trade in 
infringing files.50 
The Supreme Court further held that contributory infringement 
consisted of intentionally inducing or encouraging another to infringe 
and that vicarious infringement required a financial interest in the 
infringement coupled with a failure to stop the infringer.51  Grokster 
was distinguishable from the Sony case, insofar as Sony had no stated 
intent to promote infringement.52  Thus, the Grokster court 
(re)interpreted the Sony case, stating that it is possible for one to be 
held liable even with substantial noninfringing use.  Instead, it opened 
the possibility for indirect infringement even when there are some 
theoretically possible noninfringing uses.53 
E. RIAA Direct-Infringer Enforcement
For a number of years following the Grokster decision, attention
turned to the recording industry’s enforcement efforts against direct 
44. Id. at 921.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 922.
47. Id. at 923–24.
48. Id. at 937.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 939–40.
51. Id. at 930.
52. Id. at 938.
53. Id. at 934.
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infringers.54  Since late 2009, attention has turned back to the issue of 
secondary liability for service providers.  While the range of available 
technology has expanded since Napster in 2001, some of the old 
technology is still around.  Current cases involve peer-to-peer 
technology, such as that used in Grokster, newer and faster bit-torrent 
technology, and various forms of cloud computing. 
II. Recent Cases
Against this background, this article considers five recent cases 
decided between September 2009 and June 2010 that address the 
issue of secondary liability for online file sharing.  The five cases 
represent a range of old and new technologies, but a couple of distinct 
themes emerge. 
A. Veoh
In September 2009, the Central District of California issued a
ruling in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.55  The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Veoh on the basis of its 
DMCA safe harbor defense.56   
Veoh provides a video hosting site57 similar to YouTube. 
Launched in late 2005 or early 2006,58 the content uploaded to Veoh 
includes: (1) user-generated content; (2) unlicensed, infringing 
content; and (3) licensed, copyrighted “partner” content.59  Veoh does 
not charge users and, as of 2009, has not turned a profit.60  Veoh 
breaks the content into “chunks,”61 and formats uploaded videos into 
54. See David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA
Campaign, WIRED, (May, 18, 2010, 1:24 PM) http://www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump (charting number of copyright infringement filings from 
1993-2009, including increase in filings during RIAA enforcement campaign from 2004-
2008). 
55. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
56. Id. at 1101.
57. Id. at 1100.
58. Id. at 1101.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1102.
61. Uploading Videos Using the Veoh Uploader, VEOH, http://www.veoh.com/help
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010). 
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the Adobe Flash format.62  Users can then watch the videos as 
streaming downloads or they can download whole video files.63 
It was undisputed that some users uploaded infringing content to 
Veoh.64  However, Veoh included a prohibition on copyright 
infringement in its “Terms of Use,” and had a robust notice-and-
takedown capability, such that it was usually able to take down 
infringing content the same day that it received notice of infringing 
content and a request that it be removed.65 
In ruling for Veoh on the 512(c) safe harbor defense, the court 
analyzed four issues.  First, on the requirement of actual knowledge 
or reason to know of infringement, the court held that in this context, 
“knowledge” means specific, actual knowledge of infringement by a 
specific posting.  The court also held that “reason to know” requires 
the existence of red flags that require no effort from the service 
provider to follow up or investigate in determining whether there is 
an actual infringement.66  In other words, “reason to know” requires 
“willful ignorance of [a specific act of] readily apparent 
infringement.”67  Thus, the entire burden fell on the copyright holder 
to ensure that the provider has the requisite knowledge.  Moreover, 
giving the provider information about categories, search terms, tags, 
or even artist names is not enough to provide the requisite 
knowledge—unless the notice-provider is asserting, for example, that 
all posted works by a named artist are infringing.68  In contrast with 
Napster, where 70 percent to 87 percent of all content was infringing, 
only 5 percent to 10 percent of Veoh’s content was infringing.69  A 
general awareness that some small percentage of content infringes is 
insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge for liability.70 
Second, Veoh was found to act expeditiously to remove infringing 
content when it did obtain actual knowledge of such material.71  In the 
62. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (N.D. Cal.
2008). 
63. Playing Videos in Veoh Web Player, VEOH,  http://www.veoh.com/help (last
visited Dec. 15, 2010). 
64. See Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
65. Id. at 1102.
66. Id. at 1108.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1110.
69. Id. at 1111.
70. Id. at 1111.
71. Id. at 1112.
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few instances where Veoh received specific notice of infringing 
videos, they were “promptly removed.”72 
Third, the court found that Veoh did not have the right and ability 
to control its users’ content.73  Specifically, the court held that this 
provision requires more than a mere ability to remove infringing 
content, to implement filtering software, or to do automated 
searches.74  This “something more” as required by the DMCA might 
include, for example, prescreening sites and providing advice, neither 
of which Veoh was shown to do.75 
Finally, Veoh implemented a policy to terminate repeat 
infringers.76  The court noted that the policy must block repeated acts 
of actual infringement, not merely repeated potential infringements. 
Thus, the court deemed it sufficient to count “strikes” only when 
notice-and-takedown letters were received.77  Moreover, a policy is 
reasonable even if it treats as one “strike” a notice covering multiple 
acts of infringement, and declines to treat defective or deficient 
notice-and-takedown letters as strikes.78  Additionally, automated 
filters are too unreliable and too unverifiable to provide a basis for 
determining infringement “strikes.”79 
B. Fung
Three months later, the Central District of California issued a
decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung.80  Fung 
operated a number of websites that used bit-torrent technology.  Bit-
torrent is considered an evolutionary modification of peer-to-peer 
because the download of a large file happens simultaneously from 
many users in what is called a “swarm.”81  Fung provided websites 
that enabled users to locate “dot-torrent” files they wished to 
download.82  The lists of files provided on the website exhibited an 
awareness of possible infringement.  The lists had titles such as “Box 
72. Id. at 1118.
73. Id. at 1112.
74. See id. at 1112–13.
75. Id.  at 1114; See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1181–82 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
76. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
77. Id. at 1116.
78. Id. at 1116–17.
79. Id. at 1117–18.
80. No. CV 06-5578, 2009 WL 6355911, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *3.
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Office Movies,” “High Quality DVD Rips,” etc.83  The plaintiffs 
estimated that 95 percent of downloads conducted through Fung’s 
websites were infringing.84  Again, it was undisputed that a number of 
users were committing indirect infringement.85 
The court granted summary judgment against Fung, finding that 
he had induced copyright infringement and was not entitled to a 
DMCA safe harbor.86  To support its finding of inducing infringement, 
the court focused on Fung’s purposeful conduct and intent to 
encourage infringement.87  In particular, Fung’s messages to users 
(such as the category names for downloads) showed intent.88  
Additionally, he provided assistance to users committing 
infringement, including technical support.89  Also, somewhat 
tautologically, the court notes that he implemented technical features 
that promoted infringement because those technical features 
facilitated filesharing.90  Fung’s business model depended on massive 
infringing use, and the court found he had an “ostrich-like refusal” to 
gain knowledge about the extent of infringement on his sites.91 
Fung claimed entitlement to safe harbors under sections 512(a), 
(c), and (d).92  The court rejected subsections (a) and (c) out of hand 
as inapplicable to Fung’s services.93  The court then ruled that Fung 
was not eligible for section 512(d) safe harbor.94  On the actual 
knowledge factor, the court held that “Fung was aware that infringing 
material was available on the Defendant websites,” that 90 percent to 
95 percent of the available content was infringing, and that the 
content was organized by clearly infringing categories.  The court also 
found that Fung failed to introduce facts showing a lack of a reason to 
know.95  Unless the percentage of infringing content somehow bears 
on the court’s analysis, this ruling seems to be inconsistent with the 
Veoh ruling. 
83. Id.
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id.
86. Fung, at *15, *18.
87. Id. at *10.
88. Id. at *11.
89. Id. at *12.
90. Id. at *14.
91. Id. at *15.
92. Id. at *15–16, n.26
93. Id. at *16, n.26.
94. Id. at *16.
95. Id. at *17.
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On the second and third elements of the safe harbor analysis, the 
court found that Fung did not act expeditiously to remove or disable 
the material, and that Fung’s websites actually encouraged repeat 
infringers.96 
C. RapidShare
In May 2010, the Southern District of California issued a ruling in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Rapidshare A.G.97  RapidShare is a German based 
service that provides Internet-based “lockers” for users to store 
content online that can be accessed and downloaded by anyone with 
the “key” to the “locker.”98  RapidShare does not provide any kind of 
indexing services for data that is stored in its lockers, though some 
third-party sites do exist with that information.99  Perfect 10 owns 
copyrighted nude photographs.100  The company has been involved in 
a series of infringement lawsuits concerning the unauthorized 
republication of those photos online.  Instead of a fully compliant 
notice-and-takedown letter, Perfect 10 gave a compact disc (“CD”) of 
images to RapidShare and asked that those images be taken down.101  
Perfect 10 did not provide links or other specific information about 
where the images could be found in RapidShare’s system.102  
RapidShare nonetheless did the best it could to remove the photos.103 
Unlike LimeWire and Fung, RapidShare could not assert the 
DMCA safe harbors because it had not registered a DMCA agent 
with the Copyright Office.104 
Perfect 10 alleged direct infringement by RapidShare, but the 
court disagreed.105 The court found that RapidShare does not make 
the files in its lockers publicly available and does not index those 
files.106  Direct infringement by some third parties, however, was 
uncontested.107 
96. Id. at *12, *16.
97. No. 09-cv-2596 H (WMC),  Docket No. 71 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2010) (order
denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction). 
98. Id. at *2–3.
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id. at *7.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *9.
104. Id. at *12–13.
105. Id. at *4–5.
106. Id. at *5–6.
107. Id. at *7.
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The court also held that RapidShare was not subject to 
contributory infringement.108  RapidShare argued that it did not have 
“actual, specific knowledge” of others’ direct infringement and that 
Perfect 10’s notice-via-CD was lacking because it did not enable 
RapidShare to locate and delete the infringing files.109  The court held 
that, under the knowledge standard set forth in Napster, RapidShare 
did have sufficient knowledge of the infringement.110 
However, the court ruled that Perfect 10 failed to meet its burden 
(on motion for preliminary injunction) to show that RapidShare 
materially contributes to another’s infringing conduct.111  Unlike 
Napster, RapidShare provides no search index or other search 
function, and when given limited information about infringing photos, 
it uses that information to take down the files it can find and also does 
some independent searching.112  However, because it had a program 
that rewarded users for driving higher usage levels, it was possible 
that the development of additional facts could establish some degree 
of material contribution.113 
Borrowing from Sony (as interpreted by Grokster), the court also 
noted that there are a number of substantial lawful uses for the 
RapidShare service and, in that regard, it is distinguishable from most 
media file-sharing concepts.114 
Additionally, RapidShare has a notice of a Conditions of Use that 
prohibits copyright infringement and also has an Abuse Department 
that responds to takedown notices.115  Thus, the court found no 
liability for “contributory infringement based on [ . . . ] 
inducement.”116 
Although the court denied the preliminary injunction, there was a 
degree of ambivalence in the opinion, suggesting that the case could 
have ultimately turned out badly for RapidShare.  According to the 
108. Id. at *9.
109. Id. at *7.  Under the ruling in Veoh, this would appear to have been sufficient to
satisfy the no-knowledge requirement of the DMCA safe harbor, if RapidShare were 
eligible for the safe harbor.  See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. 
Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
110. RapidShare, No. 09-cv-2596 H (WMC) at *8.
111. Id. at *9.
112. Id. at *8–9.
113. Id. at *10.
114. Id. at *11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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docket information available on PACER/ECF, the case appears to 
have settled in July 2010.117 
D. LimeWire
Also in May 2010, the Southern District of New York issued a
ruling in a case involving Grokster-era peer-to-peer file sharing 
technology.118  LimeWire, which was launched in 2000, provided a 
user interface into which users enter search criteria.119  LimeWire then 
scanned other users’ computers to locate files that match the 
criteria.120  Selected files were then copied from the provider-user 
computer to the acquirer-user computer.121 
There was no factual dispute that users of LimeWire committed 
direct infringement.122  It was estimated that 93 percent of files 
available on LimeWire are copyrighted and not authorized for 
distribution.123  Moreover, an estimated 98.8 percent of requested 
downloads were of copyright-protected material.124 
In the May 2010 decision, which provided rulings on cross-
motions for summary judgment, there was no analysis of the DMCA 
safe harbors. 
The court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of 
contributory infringement.125  The court held that LimeWire was 
clearly aware of users’ infringement and materially contributed to the 
users’ infringing conduct, but denied summary judgment, holding that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether there was a 
substantial noninfringing use for LimeWire.126  For example, it could 
be used to distribute public domain e-books, historical documents, 
and music distributed free online by the artists.127 
117. S.D. Cal. Case No. 09-cv-2596 H (WMC),  Docket No. 107 (Minute Entry for
Telephonic Settlement Conference, dated July 28, 2010); Docket No. 109 (Order Granting 
Joint Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice, dated Aug. 13, 2010). 
118. Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481, (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
119. Id. at 494.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 507.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 515.
126. Id. at 517.
127. Id. at 517–18.  The court noted that the Grokster majority decision did not resolve
the substantial noninfringing use question, and the two concurring opinions went in 
opposite directions on whether Grokster had a substantial noninfringing use.  Id.  
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However, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment on the claim of inducing infringement.128  The court found 
that the mere creation of LimeWire was evidence of purposeful 
conduct to encourage infringement; that intent to encourage was 
established by, among other things, Lime Group’s awareness of users’ 
infringement; their efforts to attract, enable and assist infringing 
users; their dependence on infringing uses for their business model; 
and their failure to mitigate infringing activities.129 
The court denied Lime Group’s motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of vicarious liability.130  In particular, the court concluded 
that a jury could find that LimeWire profits from others’ infringement 
(via increased advertising sales), and that it failed to stop others’ 
infringement (e.g., by filtering content, denying access to infringers, 
and supervising and regulating users).131 
Finally, the court declined to extend the “substantial 
noninfringing use” doctrine to vicarious infringement.132 
E. YouTube
Finally, in June 2010, the Southern District of New York issued a
ruling in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.133  This dispute 
involves the unauthorized third-party posting of copyrighted Viacom 
content (such as clips from Comedy Central’s The Daily Show) on 
YouTube.134 
The court granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube on its 
section 512(c) safe harbor defense.  It focused on the knowledge 
element, honing in especially on whether a general awareness of 
ongoing infringement (as opposed to actual knowledge of specific 
identifiable acts of infringement), was enough to defeat the 
application of the safe harbor.135  The court concluded that “mere 
knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough” to 
defeat the safe harbor.136  It further emphasized that the infringing 
works were a tiny fraction of the millions of works posted on 
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 518.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 519.
133. 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
134. Id. at 516.
135. Id. at 519.
136. Id. at 523.
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YouTube.137  The court held that the element of a right and ability to 
control users required item-specific knowledge, not generalized 
knowledge of ubiquitous infringement.138  YouTube’s notice-and-
takedown procedures and its provision for banishing repeat offenders 
were both sufficient under the DMCA.139 
Finally, the court ruled that Grokster does not apply, because the 
DMCA gives a safe harbor even in circumstances where the 
defendant would otherwise be held liable as a contributory 
infringer.140 
III. Emerging Themes
When these cases are viewed together, a few consistent themes 
emerge.  Overall, there is a sense that the larger, more established 
providers, who play fair with content owners tend to fare better than 
brasher, more rebellious providers.  And maybe that is right, we are 
led to think, because the brasher, more rebellious providers are 
guiltier than the established ones.  Or is there a double standard at 
play here?  Could the brash, rebellious “bad guys” ever win the 
protection of the safe harbor?  It is difficult to make a direct apples-
to-apples comparison, because each case is decided on a somewhat 
different set of issues.  Nonetheless, several themes do emerge.  The 
table below summarizes some key factors from the five cases 
discussed above. 
DMCA Safe 
Harbor 
Estimated 
Infringing 
Content 
Knowledge  Business 
Model 
V
eo
h 
Yes 5–10% Specific identified items of 
infringing content, no duty to 
investigate leads 
Seeks a wide range 
of content, has not 
turned a profit 
Y
ou
T
ub
e 
Yes Small Fraction Specific knowledge required, 
generalized knowledge is 
insufficient; when Viacom sent a 
notice letter with 100,000 items, 
YouTube promptly removed 
them. 
Infringing content 
could drive higher 
traffic and 
advertising revenue 
137. Id. at 524.
138. Id. at 523.
139. Id. at 519, 527–28.
140. Id. at 526.
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R
ap
id
Sh
ar
e 
No—but has a 
substantial 
compliance 
program 
Much is subject 
to substantial 
lawful uses 
Specific identified items of 
infringing content, RapidShare 
did its best to remove content 
based on Perfect 10’s inadequate 
notice 
Fact question 
existed about 
whether reward 
system, as currently 
constituted, 
encourages 
infringement 
L
im
eW
ir
e No—not addressed 93% Clearly aware of users’ infringement 
Profits from traffic 
to site driven by 
infringing content 
F
un
g No—rejected 90-95% General awareness that 
infringing content was available 
Expressly directed 
to exploiting 
infringing content 
A comparison of the cases in this fashion suggest a couple of 
trends.  First, the existence of some form of a copyright-compliance 
program (whether fully DMCA-compliant) is an important factor to 
avoiding liability. 
Second, the percentage of infringing content on the service is 
important.  This means that data collected and statistical analysis 
methods employed can be highly relevant, more relevant perhaps 
than the absolute volume of infringing content.  For example, is the 
“small fraction” of infringing content on YouTube a larger or smaller 
number of infringing items than the 93 percent of infringing content 
on LimeWire?  It is difficult to tell, based on the reported decisions. 
Third, although the knowledge standards for secondary liability 
and the DMCA safe harbor appear to be substantively 
distinguishable, more specificity of knowledge appears to be required 
where the provider has a copyright compliance program and the 
percentage of infringing content is low. 
Finally, there seems to be a general acknowledgement throughout 
the cases that the presence of infringing content does drive more 
traffic to the provider.  This, in turn, can produce higher advertising 
revenue and other forms of revenue.  This factor seems to be part of 
the liability finding for the brash-and-rebellious “bad guys,” but is 
more readily brushed aside or excused for the other, less brash, 
defendants. 
These are only some preliminary thoughts and observations based 
on a handful of recent decisions and are intended to spur further 
discussion and curiosity about these issues.  Further analysis could 
include the following: 
 a more systematic study of secondary liability cases over a
longer period of time;
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 a deeper analysis of the statistical methods used to estimate the
percentage of infringing content; and
 an analysis of the percentage (and absolute numbers) of
infringing content on a site over its life cycle from early stage
start-up to mature industry leader—with one possible
hypothesis being that it matters when in that life cycle a
provider is sued for secondary liability.
Further analysis in these and related areas can help clarify our 
understanding of the differences between these cases, and in the 
secondary liability doctrine as a whole as it, and the underlying 
technologies for providing online digital content, continue to develop.  
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*** 
